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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1400 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
 
TYRONE D. WILLIAMS, 
a/k/a Willie Gulley 
 
Tyrone D. Williams, 
    Appellant 
 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(Crim. No. 3-07-cr-00005-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Kim R. Gibson 
 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
Monday, January 24, 2011 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, Circuit Judges, 
and STEARNS,  District Judge 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 1, 2011 ) 
 
OPINION 
 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
                                              
 Honorable Richard G. Stearns, District Court Judge, United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
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 Tyrone Williams appeals the district court’s denial of his suppression motion.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 Since we write primarily for the parties, we need not set forth the factual history of 
this case in detail.
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 Williams filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized during the multiple 
searches of the house that resulted in him entering a conditional guilty plea to violating 
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).  The plea was entered after the district court partially 
denied his motion to suppress physical evidence.    
 Williams argues that: (1) the district court erred in finding that the first search 
warrant was supported by probable cause; and (2) the Leon “good faith” exception to the 
exclusionary rule does not apply.  See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925 (1984) 
(holding that courts can “reject suppression motions posing no important Fourth 
Amendment questions by turning immediately to a consideration of the officers’ good 
faith.”).  However, since the application of Leon is determinative, we need not decide if 
the warrants were supported by probable cause. See United States v. Williams, 3 F.3d 69, 
73 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that even if an affidavit lacked probable cause, the good faith 
exception would require reversal of a district court’s suppression order). 
 “Suppression . . . is inappropriate when an officer executes a search in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a warrant’s authority.” Id. at 74; accord Leon, 468 U.S. at 920.  
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review for clear error a district 
court’s factual findings,” while conducting “plenary review of legal rulings and mixed 
questions of law and fact.” United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 395-96 (3d Cir. 
2006).  
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This Court has determined that the exception to the exclusionary rule is appropriate 
because “[i]n the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s 
probable cause determination.” Williams, 3 F.3d at 74 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 921). 
 Nevertheless, the exception does not always apply, even when a search is 
supported by a search warrant.  For example, it does not apply where an affidavit in 
support of the warrant contains knowingly or recklessly false information.  See Leon, 468 
U.S. at 923 (“Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in 
issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was 
false . . . .”).  Similarly, “in cases where the magistrate wholly abandon[s] his judicial 
role,” or when an affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official 
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” the good faith exception does not apply. Id.     
Williams argues that the affidavit was misleading because it included the 
statement from Paul’s daughter that suggested a gun was in the house.  However, the 
daughter’s statement was not false.  To the contrary, the officers’ search did reveal a gun 
in the master bedroom, which is exactly where the daughter suggested looking.   
Williams also argues that the good faith exception should not apply because the 
affidavit was “bare bones.”  As we have just explained, the good faith exception does not 
apply when an affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official 
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.  Here, however, the 
affidavit recounted the officers’ response to the domestic violence call, and explained 
why the officers believed that evidence of domestic violence would be found inside 
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Williams’ home.  Thus,  the district court did not err in concluding that the Leon 
exception  negated application of the exclusionary rule.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court’s order denying 
Williams’ request to suppress evidence pursuant to the search warrants.  
